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Abstract:A vast literature debates the efficacy of descriptive representation in legislatures. Though studies argue it influences
how communities are represented through constituency service, they are limited since legislators’ service activities are
unobserved. Using Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, we collected 88,000 records of communication between
members of the U.S. Congress and federal agencies during the 108th–113th Congresses. These legislative interventions allow
us to examine members’ “follow-through” with policy implementation. We find that women, racial/ethnic minorities, and
veterans are more likely to work on behalf of constituents with whom they share identities. Including veterans offers leverage
in understanding the role of political cleavages and shared experiences. Our findings suggest that shared experiences operate
as a critical mechanism for representation, that a lack of political consensus is not necessary for substantive representation,
and that the causal relationships identified by experimental work have observable implications in the daily work of Congress.
Replication Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results,
procedures and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VJLVYU.
Well-intentioned laws may exacerbate politicalinequality if implemented in ways that fail toaid the citizens they are intended to protect.
Yet, studies of representation focus on how constituents
are represented through the creation of law, overlooking
its execution. Accounts of federal agencies’ stalled im-
plementation of the Civil Rights Act, mismanagement
of workplace rights violations, and falsification of veter-
ans’ health care records demonstrate how cracks in the
ideals of democratic representation can spread through
policy implementation—precariously beyond the public
purview. Demands made by elected officials are an im-
portant means of remedy.
Scholars know little about how descriptive represen-
tation impacts legislative interventions with agencies on
behalf of protected groups. This overlooked venue of
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representation is particularly important given the ex-
tensive role of federal agencies in policymaking and a
history of agencies’ neglecting groups of citizens they
were entrusted to protect (Minta 2009, 2011). We shed
light on this phenomenon by examining whether mem-
bers of Congress advocate on behalf of protected classes
of citizens by communicating directly with the federal
bureaucracy.
This analysis is the first of its kind, possible only
by obtaining and constructing a unique data set of over
88,000 congressional contacts assembled from a series
of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. These
data allow us to consider whether descriptively represen-
tative members of Congress (e.g., racial and ethnic mi-
norities, women, and veterans) advocate for underrepre-
sented communities by intervening with federal agencies
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implementing law. Do representatives follow up on the
policy interests of women, minorities, and veterans long
after a bill’s passage? Do they monitor agencies to ensure
the rights of these communities are protected?
By shedding light on these questions, records of leg-
islative interventions in the bureaucracy offer a unique
approach to the study of representation. Unlike vot-
ing records, bill sponsorship, speeches, and committee
hearings—which are influenced by both internal and ex-
ternal institutional pressures—representatives are com-
paratively less constrained in their communications with
the federal bureaucracy (Grose 2011).Moreover, we build
on novel experimental work that investigates legislators’
responsiveness to constituents based on shared race and
gender (Butler 2014; Butler and Broockman 2011). By
analyzing interventions in the bureaucracy, we assess
whether the underlying causal relationships identified by
these studies on state legislators have observable, system-
atic implications in the U.S. Congress. Put differently,
our analysis assesses the quality of legislative “follow-
through” on behalf of these constituents—rather than
direct responses to the constituents themselves.
We find significant differences in the intervention
patterns of female, minority, and veteran legislators that
suggest descriptive representation leads to substantive
representation in Congress. In each case, we find that in
a given Congress, legislators are around 6–9 percentage
points more likely to contact federal agencies on behalf
of constituents with whom they share background char-
acteristics, when compared to their nonveteran, male, or
white colleagues. The differences are most striking for
women and men in Congress, where being represented
by a female legislator is associated with a 40% increase in
the probability of relevant service. These differences are
robust after accounting for factors influencing the selec-
tion of legislators, are consistent acrossmultiplemeasures
of representation, and remain when limiting the analysis
to split-representation delegations in the U.S. Senate—a
context that holds legislative district constant.
This approach advances existing work on descriptive
representation and has important implications for future
research. First, existing observational work focusing on
legislative activity must consider numerous crosscutting
influences on legislative behavior. For example, race-
or gender-related legislation can be censored (e.g., via
committees and party agenda setting) before minority
and women legislators register their votes. In contrast,
our data demonstrate comparatively “unilateral” action
on the part of legislators—not subject to chamber rules,
logrolling, and negative agenda control. This limits the
number of potential explanations for observed patterns.
Second, our approach offers a unique opportunity to
test the implications of existing experimental work. Our
analysis is descriptive and not intended to adjudicate
between alternative causal pathways of substantive
representation—such as strategic prioritization, personal
bias, or constituent behavior. Nonetheless, existing
studies investigate these mechanisms, and each implies a
similar relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation. This study evaluates whether one or
more of these mechanisms have empirical implications
that are detectable in the aggregate.
Finally, this article advances work on descriptive rep-
resentation by including military veterans, which pro-
vides two important points of theoretical leverage. First,
as Figure 1 indicates, the number of veterans in Congress
has declined even while there is broad political consen-
sus favoring veterans’ benefits—trends that are typically
the reverse in studies of the representation of women and
racial/ethnic minorities. The fact that the data still reveal
important differences among legislators suggests that the
political conflict and partisan cleavages that can charac-
terize other groups’ priorities are not necessary for de-
scriptive representation to lead to substantive representa-
tion.Our findings, consistent acrosswomen, racial/ethnic
minorities, and veterans, also suggest that the behavior of
descriptive representatives is not solely explained by his-
torical, electoral, andother contextual accounts particular
to a single group described in the extant literature. Sec-
ond, members vary in their degree of shared experience
with veterans in ways that are observable. This allows
us to empirically assess this critical mechanism of repre-
sentation often referenced in past work. In keeping with
this explanation, we find that substantive representation
of veterans is particularly pronounced among legislators
who have military service that is not confined to reserves
or state national guards.
Descriptive and Substantive
Representation in Congress
Although the extant literature typically focuses on
representation through lawmaking, protected classes of
citizens may be most vulnerable at the implementation
stage of policymaking. Policy implementation is particu-
larly critical for underrepresented communities because
it is less visible and often decentralized, involving un-
elected bureaucrats in numerous agencies and atmultiple
levels of government. Consequently, even when Congress
passes a law, it does not ensure that implementation
will be swift or follow legislative intent. For example,
research on the Civil Rights Act found that Title VI,
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FIGURE 1 Descriptive Representation in Congress
House Senate
Woman
Note: Plots indicate the number of legislators with each identity (CQMember Profiles); legislators are
classified as veterans if their occupational history includes either active-duty or reserve positions.
meant to prohibit organizations that discriminate from
receiving federal funding, was stalled by federal agencies
(see Minta 2011, 41). Additionally, some sections of the
Voting Rights Act, overseen by state-level bureaucrats,
were unevenly implemented, depending on the state and
its history with civil rights (Marschall and Rutherford
2016). Even when an agency’s primary purpose is to
serve protected groups, oversight is still necessary.1 Take,
for instance, complaints during the 1980s that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
ineffective in managing cases of workplace civil rights
violations (Minta 2011, 54) or the more recent findings
that medical records had been falsified at Veterans Affairs
(VA), compromising the health care of thousands of
citizens.2
Protected classes of citizens rely on elected represen-
tatives to advocate on their behalf and are dependent on
the alacrity of legislators’ intervention with unelected bu-
reaucrats. The dependence on legislator intervention is
concerning given that modern legislators face an increas-
ingly large set of demands for their attention but a limited
set of resources to work with (Curry 2015), and partic-
ipation in policy implementation and oversight is con-
sidered particularly costly with little to gain electorally
1While oversight does occur, publicly, in committees, this formal
oversight is constrained by party leadership. By contacting agencies
directly, legislators can send signals of their priorities, but without
waiting for a scheduled hearing and even when they are not on
committees with jurisdiction.
2Seehttps://www.justice.gov/usao-sdga/pr/va-employee-sentenced
-federal-prison-falsifying-medical-records-hundreds-veterans.
(Hall and Miler 2008; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Agency oversight occurs largely beyond the purview of
the public. In this context, legislators must set priori-
ties, elevating the importance of some issues and tasks at
the expense of others—inevitably signaling who they are
choosing to represent (Hall 1996).3
Some studies suggest legislators who are themselves
members of protected groups prioritize the representa-
tion of these citizens and, consequently, are more tena-
cious advocates. For example, a large body of research has
focused on whether female and minority legislators be-
have differently than their male and white counterparts.
Often grounded in theories of descriptive representation,
many scholars expect that legislators’ personal charac-
teristics and experiences will shape their legislative pri-
orities and policy preferences. To the extent that these
preferences are shared among the group at large (e.g.,
women) but are unique among elected officials (who are
overwhelmingly male), the presence of descriptive rep-
resentatives leads to greater substantive representation
for that group (Mansbridge 1999). Interviews with leg-
islators and their staff provide preliminary evidence in
3Of course, congressional staffers, rather than legislators them-
selves, are often involved in intervening with agencies. Schol-
ars have long recognized that behavior attributed to legislators
(e.g., bill introductions, cosponsorships) is influenced by their staff
(Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). However, staffers have an incentive
to moderate their behavior to reflect the preferences and priorities
of the legislator (Hall 1996), especially when in an official capacity
as a representative of their office. Additionally, some work (Grose,
Mangum, and Martin 2007) indicates that descriptive representa-
tives hire staff who share their background characteristics.
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favor of this view (Burden 2007; Grose 2011; Swers 2002,
2013).
However, quantitative research on descriptive repre-
sentation has overwhelmingly focused on roll-call votes
with generally mixed results. One explanation for these
varied results could be the constraints (e.g., agenda set-
ting) on legislators’ voting behavior. Formal legislative ac-
tivity, like voting, is shaped by crosscutting influences on
legislative behavior, including chamber rules or pressure
from leadership, forcing members to be more strategic
and limiting the extent to which they are free to vote their
conscience (or background). Instead, legislators’ parti-
san attachment and district preferences dominate their
voting behavior (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Tate 2003). Is-
sues on which we would expect to observe different be-
havior from minority and women legislators are likely
censored from the agenda. Party leaders do not want to
schedule votes that will reveal divisions within the party,
whether along racial or gender lines. Thus, observing vot-
ing behavior alone is likely to depress effects of descriptive
representation and exaggerate party unity. Since issues
on which we would expect to observe different behavior
from minority and women legislators may never make it
to the floor for a vote, studies that do find differences are
noteworthy.4
Existing scholarship examining “proactive” expres-
sions of representation, including bill introductions
and committee participation (Burden 2007), provides
a clearer consensus that descriptive representation in-
fluences responsiveness across gender (e.g., Dodson
2006; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Swers 2002;
Wolbrecht 2000, 2002) and race (e.g.,Gamble 2007;Minta
2009, 2011), but effect sizes are often small.5 Like roll-call
votes, however, these upstream formal legislative behav-
iors are still public and easily observable, making them
susceptible to the same constraints and cross-pressures
from constituents, the media, party leadership, and other
4Some work concludes that African American (e.g., Canon 1999;
Grose 2005; Swain 1993) and Latino (e.g., Fraga, Lopez, Martinez-
Ebers, and Ramirez 2007) legislators vote differently than their
white colleagues. In general, women representatives have more
liberal voting records, particularly when it comes to “feminist”
issues such as abortion (Swers 1998; Welch 1985).
5For example, black legislators are more likely than their white
colleagues to introduce bills (e.g., Haynie 2001; Tate 2003), par-
ticipate in committee (e.g., Gamble 2007; Minta 2009, 2011), and
make floor speeches (e.g., Canon 1999) on issues of importance
to black Americans. Latino legislators introduce more bills related
to issues important to Latinos (Bratton 2006). Women prioritize
social welfare and issues important to women, reflected in their bill
sponsorship, committee participation, and floor behavior (Dodson
2006; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Swers 2002). Women in
Congress bring women’s rights to the agenda (Wolbrecht 2000,
2002).
members of Congress (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold,
and Zorn 1997; Crespin 2010; Ritchie 2018). Visibility
can hinder the ability for congresswomen to advocate for
the interests of women, for example, if they face pressure
from co-partisans with more extreme ideological per-
spectives and wish to maintain choice committee assign-
ments or move into leadership positions (Dodson 2006;
Swers 2002). Additionally, external political forces, like an
upcoming election, may constrain the behavior of mem-
bers from protected groups as well. For example, African
Americanmembersmay have an electoral incentive to not
appear to be catering to black voters rather than reach-
ing out to their white constituency (Canon 1999; and see
Shaw v. Reno, 509U.S. 630, 1993). Overall, the visibility of
legislators’ behavior, at any point in the lawmaking pro-
cess, can depress their ability andmotivation to represent
protected group interests (cf. Bishin 2009).
A growing body of research considers less visible leg-
islator behaviors. Additional observational studies exam-
ining earmarks for protected groups and casework (e.g.,
Grose 2011; Grose, Mangum, andMartin 2007), find that
descriptively representative legislators are more respon-
sive to the groups they represent. Moreover, recent field
experiments on state legislators consider responses to
constituent emails. Broockman (2013) finds that black
state legislators are more likely than white legislators to
respond to contacts from black citizens who report liv-
ing outside their district. Likewise, black state legislators
are more likely than their white counterparts to respond
to requests for help with registering to vote when sent
from black aliases (Butler and Broockman 2011). With
regard to gender, although women legislators show a
balanced response across women’s issues and other is-
sues not related to gender, men tend to show less re-
sponsiveness to constituent contact related to women’s
issues (Butler 2014). These findings suggest that legisla-
tors from protected groups work on behalf of protected
classes of citizens when their behavior is both public and
private—suggesting that their efforts are sincere, as op-
posed to strategic.
However, this work raises several additional ques-
tions. First, it is unclear whether the same mechanisms
generalize beyond state legislatures to the U.S. Congress
or beyond black and female legislators to other protected
groups. Second, and more importantly, it is unclear
whether the mechanisms identified have an observable
impact on patterns of representation. These questions are
critical since experimental results demonstrate striking
differences with apparent implications for democratic
representation. We build on the existing literature by
addressing some unanswered, and unexamined, ques-
tions using novel data, and provide clarity to competing
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explanations for the substantive behavior of descrip-
tive representatives.
Interbranch Representation of Protected
Groups
We argue that descriptive representation provides
substantive representation through intervention with the
bureaucracy for two main reasons.6 First, these repre-
sentatives’ backgrounds may give them information and
insight into the potential for neglect and mistreatment
of the protected communities with which they have
shared experiences and a common history (Burden 2007;
Mansbridge 1999; Swers 2013). Second, a sense of shared
group identification is likely to motivate members of
Congress to be diligent advocates for those communities
(Burden 2007; Hall 1996; Mansbridge 1999; Minta 2011;
Swers 2002). This motivation is important because par-
ticipation is not universal but is highly selective.Members
who have an interest in a certain outcome have to invest
more than just votes. When highly motivated, legislators
are willing to pay a greater cost (Hall 1996). These shared
experiences drive legislators to reign in agency discretion,
making themmore vigilant watchmen for discriminatory
practices and neglect. Thus, these members of protected
groups in Congress serve as attentive advocates for
citizens of their respective communities.
This interbranch communication between legislators
and bureaucrats is important because it can have conse-
quences for policy outcomes. Scholars find, for example,
that direct contact from legislators can influence, and
even reverse, bureaucratic decision making (Ritchie and
You, 2019). This type of communication has the poten-
tial to impact how protected classes of citizens experience
policies by shaping implementation.
Of course, there are other factors influencing these
interventions. Most prominently, citizens of protected
communities may be more likely to contact legislators
with shared experiences, thus increasing the volume of
“fire alarms” for those legislators (Broockman 2014;
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Existing work, there-
fore, suggests that both mechanisms may contribute to
observed differences. Our study does not challenge this
conclusion. However, in supplementary analyses, we find
evidence that suggests our findings cannot be attributed
wholly to constituent demand-side effects.
6We confine our attention to shared identities, rather than advocacy
on behalf of underrepresented groups in general. Questions about
whether representation in this way is zero-sum across identities is
left for future work.
Military Service and Substantive
Representation
By considering military service in addition to race and
gender, we investigate open questions about the condi-
tions that lead legislators to advocate for citizens with
shared identities and experiences. Although much of the
existing literature on descriptive representation focuses
on visible characteristics such as race or gender, there
is no theoretical reason to limit our focus to physical
features (Mansbridge 1999). The experience of being a
woman or black shapes the way people see and experi-
ence theworld inmeaningfulways, but sodoes an individ-
ual’s profession or having a loved one with health issues
(Burden 2007). These other shared experiences can be
just as meaningful, if not more important, for certain
segments of the population or for certain issue areas
(Bishin 2009). Surprisingly, the impact of military ex-
perience has been understudied as a form of descriptive
representation. At minimum, the fact that veterans are
among groups with protected legal status suggests inclu-
sion in studies of descriptive representation is warranted.
However, assessing the influence of military service pro-
vides two important points of theoretical leverage.
First, past work suggests that political disagreements
over government programs with an impact on the well-
being of women and racial/ethnic minorities are, in part,
behind patterns of substantive representation. For exam-
ple, Swers (2002) argues that legislators are generally risk
averse and blame avoidant, and so they tend to avoid is-
sues that could be contentious, including issues that fall
within cultural and civil rights debates, such as repro-
ductive rights and affirmative action programs. Thus, de-
scriptive representatives’ behavior is important on these
controversial issues because it requires intense interest for
the legislator to advocate for policies that may carry po-
litical risk (Swers 2002, 12). While arriving at a different
conclusion than Swers, Grose (2011) also argues that po-
litical conflict and rational electoral incentives play a role
in the relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation. He argues black legislators, tasked with
holding together a coalition of white and black voters, use
constituency service to serve their black core supporters
in a less visible venue that will avoid making white vot-
ers feel as though they are not getting their “fair share”
(Grose 2011, 28).
In contrast, support for veterans’ programs is widely
considered nonpartisan. Representation of veterans is not
viewed as sacrificing the representation of nonveterans,
and veterans’ priorities receive broad, bipartisan support
and are generally not characterized by the same political
conflict as gender and race. Rare exceptions are the
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foreign policy and defense votes used in previous studies,
which do not directly implicate the salaries and benefits
of those who have served (Bianco 2005; Lupton 2017).7 If
political conflict is necessary for substantive representa-
tion via descriptive representation, then military service
backgrounds should not be associated with interventions
on behalf of veterans.
Second, existing studies suggest that the shared expe-
riences (e.g., quality of education, proximity to violence)
proxied for by background characteristics, rather than
the characteristics themselves, are a critical mechanism
that leads to substantive representation (Sen and Wasow
2016). In the case of veterans, the degree of shared expe-
rience is, in some sense, observable. Members enter office
with wide variation in military background; some have
2–3 years of service in state national guards, whereas oth-
ers have extensive combat experience in foreign wars. If
shared experiences are indeed important, we argue this
variation should matter: Members with more military
service should be more likely to intervene on behalf of
veterans. Specifically, veterans, especially those with ac-
tive duty service in the Army, Navy,Marines, or Air Force,
should be more responsive than nonveteran legislators
(Hall 1996; Mansbridge 1999).8
Measuring Representation with
Constituent Inquiries
A key contribution of this study is to evaluate expecta-
tions associated with descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation using previously unanalyzed records of con-
gressional communication with the bureaucracy. We use
these records to construct a measure of legislator inter-
vention on behalf of protected classes of citizens. Beyond
the relative novelty of this approach, these data have sev-
eral virtues. Legislators’ communication with agencies is
7WhereasBianco (2005) does not find adifference between veterans
and nonveterans in the U.S. House on defense and foreign policy
votes,whennarrowing the focus to votes that increase congressional
oversight over war operations, Lupton (2017) finds that military
experience does matter.
8The VA offers a wide variety of benefits to U.S. Armed Forces
veterans, but who is considered a veteran, and thus becomes
eligible for benefits, is narrowly defined (See https://www.every
crsreport.com/reports/R42324.html). Most who served in reserves
and national guards fail to meet the eligibility requirements for
VA benefits. Since even well-intentioned members from an out-
side group lack full understanding that leads to proactive behavior
(Mansbridge 1999), reserve experience, while important, may not
lead to the types of behavior we expect to see in this study if we
assume shared experience is a mechanism that drives legislator
behavior.
the ideal place to look for substantive representation be-
cause, as Grose (2011, 25) argues, legislators “have com-
plete control over decisions related to serving constituents
with casework.”
Our data also improve upon one pastmeasure of sub-
stantive representation: the allocation of “pork” projects.
Though these projects provide clear and targeted ben-
efits within a given district, they were still approved
by majority coalitions. Since the ban, legislators have
been forced to lobby bureaucratic agencies to achieve
targeted benefits (Mills, Kalaf-Hughes, and MacDonald
2016). Thus, the outcome is mediated by the executive
branch—which many have found allocates funds strate-
gically (e.g., Kriner and Reeves 2015). In contrast, we use
records of direct contact (e.g., letters, calls, emails) from
members of Congress to bureaucratic agencies on be-
half of constituents. We argue this provides a more direct
measurement of substantive representation than has been
previously available for observational research—limiting
the number of alternative explanations for uncovered
relationships. Contact data come from correspondence
logs maintained by 15 agencies (Lowande 2018, 2019;
Mills, Kalaf-Hughes, andMacDonald 2016; Ritchie 2018;
Ritchie and You, 2019).9 These logs were collected via
Freedom of Information Act requests. Overall, our data
contain 88,519 usable contacts from legislators as logged
by the agencies outlined in Table 1.10
Why does legislator intervention with agencies pro-
vide meaningful measures of substantive representation?
Several of the agencies in question are the principal fed-
eral authorities responsible for policies targeted to the
groups in question. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act outlines the EEOC’s mission—to enforce prohibi-
tions against discrimination in the workplace. Though
these laws prohibit discrimination against any race, color,
or national origin and any sex, their intent and effect have
been to protect women and racial or ethnic minorities.11
The VA’s primary mandate is to serve military veterans
and their dependents, while operating the largest system
9We selected these seven executive departments and eight other
agencies based on their jurisdictions, responses to FOIA requests,
quality of the records provided, and whether the records provided
all of the information and level of detail necessary.
10By “usable,” we mean cases that identify the contacting legislator,
include the contact date, and contain a description of the inquiry.
Fewer than 200 cases had to be excluded because one or all of these
were missing, or because the contact did not come from a federal
elected official.
11Note that the EEOC also enforces laws against age and dis-
ability discrimination, but the vast majority of cases involve
racial/ethnic or sex discrimination. In 2015, the lattermade up 78%
of the EEOC’s caseload. See https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/index.cfm.
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TABLE 1 Data Coverage for Legislator Interventions
Agency 109 110 111 112 113 N
Armed Forces Retirement Home
√ √ √ √
19
Corp. for National & Community Service
√
213
Consumer Product Safety Commission –
√ √
– 339
Department of Education
√ √ √
– 2,892
Department of Energy
√ √
– 4,403
Department of Homeland Security
√ √ √ √
24,305
Department of Housing and Urban Development
√ √ √
8,846
Department of the Interior
√
916
Department of Labor
√ √ √ √
28,570
Department of Veterans Affairs
√
1,109
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
√ √ √
3,499
Environmental Protection Agency
√ √ √ √ √
11,951
Federal Reserve
√
438
National Science Foundation
√ √ √
872
U.S. Agency for International Development
√ √ √
895
Note: Checkmark indicates records include full date coverage of Congress; dash indicates partial coverage.
of health care facilities in the United States. They are the
federal government’s arbiter of disability compensation,
retirement benefits, financial services, and medical care
of veterans.
Other agencies in our data also have jurisdiction over
statutes that offer opportunities for substantive repre-
sentation. The Department of Education is charged with
enforcing Title IX regulations at colleges and universities.
TheDepartment of Labor enforces theUniformed Service
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),
which assists servicememberswithproblemsmaintaining
employment. Even agencies without specifically targeted
laws often run programs with group-specific relevance.
The Department of Energy maintains an office dedicated
to promoting research at minority-serving educational
institutions. Moreover, since the early 1960s, presidents
have used their authority to promote government-wide
diversity in grant writing and contracting (Gitterman
2017). All agencies that engage in either activity must
adhere to these standards. This creates yet another op-
portunity for legislator interventions. Put simply, leg-
islative interventions that serve the interests of women,
racial/ethnic minorities, and veterans are likely to go
through these agencies’ offices.
Nonetheless, these data do have limitations that are
important to present. Our sample of agencies is limited
to those responding to FOIA requests and to the time
series they provide. Often, agencies are reticent to release
records for a long time series because of a labor-intensive
review and redaction process. This is especially true in
large agencies. As a result, coverage of particular con-
gresses varies by agency. As Table 1 indicates, our records
of intervention aremost highly concentrated in the 110th,
111th, and 112th Congresses.
This raises a few potential concerns. First, the vol-
ume of contact will vary by congress because of arbitrary
differences in our data coverage. Second, the presence
or absence of particular agencies with high volumes of
representation contact could bias a given congress toward
higher counts. For example, diversity inCongress is trend-
ing upward, so the introduction of the EEOC correspon-
dence log in the 110th Congress could create a spurious
association between our key independent and dependent
variables. We take two steps to address these concerns.
First, we dichotomize the key dependent variables, which
are coded 1 for at least one intervention on behalf of a par-
ticular group in a given congress, and 0 otherwise. This
reduces the potential for error by collapsing variation in
the count of contact thatmay be due to the coverage issues
discussed above. Second, we provide multiple specifica-
tions of each dependent variable that exclude agencies for
which we do not have complete coverage from the 110th–
112th Congresses. Reassuringly, we find that our results
are generally not sensitive to arbitrary inclusion or exclu-
sion of particular congresses. When this is not the case,
we explicitly note it in our presentation of the results.
Our aim is to identify cases of substantive represen-
tation of legally protected classes. Specifically, our depen-
dent variables are intended to measure legislators’ inter-
vention with federal agencies on behalf of either racial or
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ethnic minorities, women, or veterans. Each intervention
on behalf of a protected class is considered separately. All
correspondence descriptions were read and hand-coded
by the authors. The coding definitions, procedures, exam-
ples, and inter-coder reliability diagnostics can be found
in Appendix A of the supporting information (SI; A1).
In short, we coded a contact as a relevant intervention if
the description provided by the agency indicated that the
legislator was working on behalf of, supporting, or ad-
vocating for an individual or a group of individuals who
are legally protected. Only cases of positive representation
of protected classes were included in the dependent vari-
ables. In other words, contacts describing a constituent
opposing protections for protected classes were not coded
affirmatively.12
To be coded affirmatively, the description had to ex-
plicitly support the group in question. By “explicit,”we do
not mean that the contact necessarily had to contain the
word, woman or African American, but that the support
for veterans, women, or racial and ethnic minorities had
to be clear and narrowly defined. For example, if a contact
description read, “in support of the NAACP” or “in sup-
port of Morehouse College,” it would be coded as a case
of substantive representation of a racial/ethnic minority.
This means that we did not include contacts that were
about issues that have been broadly defined, for example,
as “women’s issues” (e.g., child health or education) in
previous literature. Moreover, the group supported can-
not be ambiguous. For example, occasionally, the EEOC
notes that a constituent “alleges discrimination” with-
out referencing the type of discrimination (e.g., sex, age,
race/ethnicity, disability). These cases were excluded. For
this reason, if anything, our data may slightly undercount
relevant interventions.
The policy content of substantive representation
varies dramatically by agency and can address the con-
cerns of a particular constituent or the group as a whole.
For example, employment-related contacts may advo-
cate on behalf of a constituent with a discrimination
case or ask the agency to provide detailed information
about its plans for hiring a diverse workforce. Likewise,
grant-related contacts may be letters of support for spe-
cific applicants or inquiries about grants available for
12One potential concern is that legislators may strategically ref-
erence legally protected groups in order to improve the odds of
influencing agency behavior—even when the policy in question
does not directly implicate that group alone. For example, a legis-
lator may add “as a veteran” to his or her letter to increase the odds
of influencing environmental regulation. Importantly, the corre-
spondence logs provide no opportunity for this kind of behavior,
as they are terse summaries of the policy or program implicated
and are free of any references to legislators’ identities, motivations,
or arguments.
the benefit of veterans, women, or racial/ethnic minori-
ties. Additional examples are reported in Appendix A of
the SI (A2).
Research Design
Our empirical strategy is to compare the group-specific
interventions of legislators who do and do not descrip-
tively represent particular constituent groups. For all
models, our unit of analysis is legislator-congress, and
the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for in-
tervention on behalf of the group in question. Since we
test our expectations in the context of each group sepa-
rately, the precise variables and functional form of each
analysiswill differ.However, in general, our approach is to
estimate the effect of each legislator’s descriptive charac-
teristic while accounting for potential confounders. Most
importantly, our aim is to account for selection into be-
ing represented by a legislator with various backgrounds.
For each group, we evaluate this in three ways: sim-
ple difference-of-means among split-Senate delegations,
cross-sectional regression controlling for confounders,
and coarsened-exact matching. Our results are largely
consistent across each. We confine the main text to the
discussion and presentation of substantively interpretable
marginal effects, with full results reported in the SI.
Prior to presenting these results, it is important to
reiterate two points about identification. First, since can-
didate selection is explicitly endogenous to constituent
preferences, our analysis is properly thought of as descrip-
tive. Second, and relatedly, our analysis is not intended to
adjudicate between alternative causal mechanisms exam-
ined by previous experimental research. As Butler (2014)
notes, politicians may have strategic and nonstrategic
reasons to prioritize certain requests and perform case-
work. That is, they may prioritize serving electorally rel-
evant constituents or exhibit personal bias (Butler and
Broockman 2011). Moreover, descriptive characteristics
may influence the likelihood constituents choose to con-
tact legislators at all (Broockman2014). Importantly, each
of these potential mechanisms suggests the same rela-
tionship: that descriptive representation ought to trans-
late into substantive representation. Thus, support for
our hypotheses should be taken as evidence that one or
more of these causal mechanisms has meaningful impli-
cations that are observable in the aggregate. We revisit
questions about these mechanisms when discussing our
results.
Legislator background was coded using CQ Press’s
congressionalmember profiles. Sex and race/ethnicity are
taken directly from these records. The lack of diversity
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in Congress limits our ability to make inferences about
any particular race or ethnicity. For the purposes of this
analysis, the key independent variable is a dichotomous
indicator for racial/ethnic minority background. With
few exceptions, legislators were coded as having military
service if they satisfied the federal definition of veteran,
which includes two criteria: active-duty service followed
by discharge via some means other than dishonorable.13
To assess the relative influence of shared experience, we
also provide an alternative measure that excludes legis-
lators who would be classified as reservists in common
parlance: those who served exclusively in reserve compo-
nents of the armed forces (e.g., Army/Navy Reserve, Air
National Guard) or in state national guards.
For each group, we leverage multiple potential
measures to account for member selection. Figure 2
plots each measure alongside its corresponding legislator
characteristic. For constituents with military service, we
use veteran population (VetPop) or total VA expenditures
by district. These data are aggregated and maintained
by the VA (Figure 2b). Importantly, however, the VetPop
survey data are imputed by unknown means, and the
VA does not report corresponding error estimates. Thus,
we regard reported expenditures as more reliable. They
are correlated with selection of a legislator with military
service (Figure 2a). For gender and race/ethnic back-
ground, we use estimates of district ideology developed
by Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013). We plot these in
Figure 2d. District liberalism is correlated with selection
in both cases. Finally, for race/ethnic background, we
also use district race/ethnicity population estimates
(Figure 2f). Each of these measures is modestly correlated
in the expected direction with our key independent
variables. All regressionmodels will also include chamber
and Congress fixed effects to account for time-specific
shocks, so our results leverage variation between same-
chamber legislators within a given congress. Since our
models are meant to account for factors that lead to the
selection of representative legislators, we refrain from
presenting results with an exhaustive set of potential
covariates. Nonetheless, SI Appendix B reports additional
results with controls for poverty, legislator seniority, and
state fixed effects. In general, the results we present in
text are robust to these specifications.
We are also cognizant of the basic limitations of our
time-series and data availability. One general concern is
that the number of veterans, women, and racial/ethnic
13Mitch McConnell, for example, satisfies both criteria, but served
for 3 months in the Army Reserve and secured a medical discharge
for an ailment (optic neuritis), which was cured months after.
Veteran interest groups unanimously omit McConnell from public
lists of “legislators who served.”
minorities in Congress will limit our ability to confi-
dently detect differences across groups. To investigate this,
we conducted a simulation study of congressional repre-
sentation during this period (Appendix C, A9–A10). We
find that the research design described above recovers the
effect for veterans in 75% of simulations if the true ef-
fect for veterans is greater than a 0.55 standard deviation.
Predictably, our design is less effective at recovering the
effects for gender and race/ethnicity. For race/ethnicity,
the effect size would have to be implausibly large (1.5
standard deviations) to hit the same 75% threshold. This
illustrates a basic point: that our analysis likely biases
against finding affirmative evidence of descriptive repre-
sentation for women and racial/ethnic minorities, pro-
viding a conservative test of the link between descriptive
and substantive representation.
Findings
Overall, we find consistent evidence that descriptive
representation matters for substantive representation in
Congress. There are substantively significant differences
in the content of interventions by legislators’ military ser-
vice, gender, and race/ethnicity. These differences persist
after accounting for confounders and “pruning” the data
set to comparable units. The most striking differences
are among male and female legislators, with women in
Congress around 8 percentage points more likely to con-
tact agencies on behalf of women. This is particularly
striking because the baseline probability of such con-
tact is around 20 percentage points. We also find that
the degree of shared experience matters for substantive
representation. The differences in veteran interventions
are driven by legislators with active-duty service in the
Army, Navy, Marines, or Air Force. That is, legislators
who served in their states’ national guard or in reserves do
not meaningfully differ in their volume of interventions
from those with no military background. These findings
suggest that shared experience operates as a criticalmech-
anism for representation.
Military Service
Table 2 reports differences in mean veteran interventions
across legislator groups. For each analysis that follows,
the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator
for at least one group-specific intervention in a given
congress, so the results can be interpreted as conditional
probabilities. We present differences for all legislators,
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FIGURE 2 Representatives and the Represented
Members with Military Service
Women in the House
Note: Plots  indicate proportion of legislators with military service from the 108–111th Congresses, and of
the population who are veterans; darker shades indicate higher values.
Note: Plots  indicate proportion of female legislators serving from the 108–111th Congresses, and the
ideology of each district, according to Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013); darker shades indicate
higher values.
Note: Plots  indicate proportion of legislators with racial/ethnic minority background serving from the
108–111th Congresses, and the nonwhite population of each district; darker shades indicate higher
values.
District Ideology
Race / Ethnicity in the House Race / Ethnicity of Constituents
Veteran Constituents
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TABLE 2 Representation Differences across Members withMilitary Service
Any Veteran Nonveterans Veterans Difference (95% CI)
All Legislators 0.25 0.31 +0.06 [0.01, 0.10]
(n = 2194)
Split-Senate Delegations 0.44 0.60 +0.16 [0.01, 0.31]
(n = 170)
Excluding Reservists Nonveterans Veterans Difference (95% CI)
All Legislators 0.25 0.34 +0.09 [0.04, 0.15]
(n = 2194)
Split-Senate Delegations 0.43 0.65 +0.22 [0.04, 0.41]
(n = 110)
Note: Dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of intervention on behalf of veterans in the agencies in Table 1; the unit of analysis
is legislator-congress; means and difference of means are by subgroup; split-Senate delegations are those with one member with military
service.
TABLE 3 Military Service and Veterans Representation
Dependent Variable
All Contact 110th–112th Cong.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Veteran (Any) 0.029 0.047
(0.024) (0.028)
Veteran (Excluding Reservists) 0.068 0.072
(0.030) (0.032)
Commonspace Ideology −0.016 −0.016 −0.030 −0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.25)
ln(Veteran Expenditures) 0.073 0.073 0.070 0.071
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Congress Fixed Effects
√ √ √ √
N 2,194 2,194 1,654 1,654
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.09
Note: “All Contact” is a dichotomous indicator for intervention on behalf of veterans in the agencies in Table 1; “110th–112th” is a
subset of these congresses for the agencies with whom we have a complete record; the unit of analysis is legislator-congress; least squares
coefficients with standard errors are clustered by legislator in parentheses; all models control for chamber; Congress intercepts are omitted
for readability.
as well as split-Senate delegations. These are pairs of
senators in a given congress who represent the same state
but have different backgrounds. This allows us to hold
constituency constant. In each case, there are consistent
and substantively significant differences across legislators
with military experience. These differences are stronger
when those who served solely in reserves or national
guards are not coded as veteran legislators. It is also
larger for split-Senate delegations. In general, senators
intervene with agencies more frequently, so the baseline
probability of contact is higher. Senators with military
service are 22 percentage points more likely to perform
veteran-related interventions than their nonveteran,
same-state colleagues.
These differences are robust to accounting for various
confounders and alternative measures of representation.
In Table 3, we report least squared estimates that control
for legislator ideology and logged veteran expenditures.
As Models 2 and 4 indicate, differences in interventions
are primarily driven by veteranswithmore than reserve or
national guard experience. InModel 4, veterans are about
7 percentage points more likely to contact an agency on
behalf of veterans. Inclusion of confounders that should
contribute to legislator selectionmay bias these estimates.
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TABLE 4 Representation Differences across
Gender
Male Female
Difference
(95% CI)
All Legislators 0.11 0. 23 +0.12 [0.07, 0.16]
(n = 2194)
Split-Senate
Delegations
0.13 0. 34 +0.21 [0.02, 0.40]
(n = 76)
Note: Dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for inter-
vention on behalf of women in the agencies in Table 1; the unit
of analysis is legislator-congress; means and difference of means
are by subgroup; split-Senate delegations are those with one fe-
male member.
To account for the concern, we report results from a data
set matched on each covariate in the SI. As SI Table B2
indicates, this largely replicates the findings reported in
Tables 2 and 3 (A3). Restricting our analysis to the agen-
cies for whichwe have complete coverage from the 110th–
112th Congresses does not alter these results.
We do, however, find several inconsistencies in these
results. One comes when we restrict analysis to the 112th
Congress (SI Table B1, A3). This is the congress for which
we have the most data, as it includes the log from the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs. Though the estimates are
the expected sign, the confidence intervals are wider be-
cause of the reduction in sample size. A second is that
these results are not robust to the inclusion of additional
controls—specifically, seniority and state fixed effects.
We report these results in SI Table B3. The effects are
“marginally” significant at conventional levels (p < .1)
and in the expected direction (A4). But again, this under-
scores the inherent difficultly of uncovering systematic
differences across groups with our limited time series.
Gender
We find striking differences in legislator intervention
across gender. Table 4 reports significant difference-in-
means estimates for all legislators and split delegations.
The marginal increase in each case is large enough to
merit skepticism. However, it is noteworthy that rates
of contact are statistically distinguishable even after re-
ducing the sample size to the 76 senators in split delega-
tions.This provides apreliminary indicationof important
differences in women’s representation to administrative
agencies.
The multivariate results in Table 5 support these dif-
ferences. Women in Congress are about 8 percentage
TABLE 5 Gender andWomen’s Representation
(1) (2)
Female 0.079 0.083
(0.020) (0.021)
Commonspace Ideology −0.196
(0.015)
District Ideology −0.256
(0.024)
Congress Fixed Effects
√ √
N 2,194 2,194
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.19
Note: Dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for inter-
vention on behalf of women in the agencies in Table 1; the
unit of analysis is legislator-congress; least squares coefficients
with standard errors are clustered by legislator in parentheses; all
models control for chamber; Congress intercepts are omitted for
readability.
pointsmore likely to intervene on behalf of women. Reas-
suringly, other covariates exhibit expected relationships
with agency contact. Legislators with more conservative
voting records or who have more conservative districts
are less likely to perform this kind of service. We take
this as evidence that our dependent variable is measuring
theoretically relevant substantive representation.14 Again,
these estimates are robust to excluding observationswith-
out comparable cases, or including additional controls
and state fixed effects. SI Table B5 reports regression es-
timates for a data set matched with chamber, congress,
and measures of district preferences (A5). SI Table B6
reports estimates that include additional controls (A6).
Substantive findings across these analyses are consistent.
Race, Ethnicity, and National Origin
We report least squared estimates for the substantive rep-
resentation of racial/ethnic minorities in Table 6. For this
section, we forgo presenting difference-of-means results
because—as Figure 1 indicates—the number of compar-
ison cases is small. This means that differences across the
full sample are noisy, and limiting comparisons to split-
Senate delegations is essentially meaningless. Nonethe-
less, there are some noteworthy differences in Table 6.
Though the results are somewhat inconsistent across
14Our analyses suggest that legislators who are members of pro-
tected classes advocate more for issues of importance to those
classes. However, our coding procedure provides a narrow defini-
tion of women’s issues (e.g., violence against women, reproductive
rights) and does not include topics, such as children’s issues or ed-
ucation, that have been included in broader definitions of women’s
issues in some previous studies.
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TABLE 6 Race/Ethnicity andMinority
Representation
Dependent Variable
All Contact 110th–112th Cong.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonwhite 0.091 0.060 0.090 0.078
(0.034) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043)
District
Ideology
−0.153 −0.203
(0.041) (0.043)
District %
White
−0.276 −0.264
(0.075) (0.082)
Congress
Fixed
Effects
√ √ √ √
N 2,194 2,194 1,654 1,654
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11
Note: “All Contact” is a dichotomous indicator for intervention on
behalf of a racial/ethnicminority in the agencies in Table 1; “110th–
112th” is subset of these congresses for the agencies with whom we
have a complete record; unit of analysis is legislator-congress; least
squares coefficients with standard errors are clustered by legislator
in parentheses; all models control for chamber; Congress intercepts
are omitted for readability.
measures of constituency demand, there appears to be a
positive relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation. In models that account for district ideol-
ogy, the difference is about 9 percentage points. Again, the
baseline probability of such contact is low (about 30%),
so this difference is large and substantively meaningful.
These estimates are less certain when controlling for
nonwhite district population in the multivariate models.
Importantly, however, the matching results reported in
SI Table B8 show more consistent differences (A7). After
dropping several hundred white legislators with no plau-
sibly comparable legislator from a different racial/ethnic
background, there is about a 10 percentage point dif-
ference in the probability of constituency contact. The
results are similar after including district poverty rate and
legislator seniority as covariates, or state fixed effects to
account for unobserved heterogeneity across delegations
(SI Table B9, A8).
Mechanisms
Notably, the analyses above did not distinguish between
two alternative (though not mutually exclusive) causal
pathways: Legislators are more likely to represent groups
with whom they share identities because shared back-
groundsmotivatemembers to bemore diligent advocates
or because constituents from those groups aremore likely
to contact them.However, since recent work on represen-
tation has emphasized delineating between these poten-
tial mechanisms (Broockman 2013, 2014; Butler 2014;
Butler and Broockman 2011), we investigate differences
in types of legislator interventions. From our sample of
legislator interventions, we removed categories princi-
pally concerned with “casework” from individual con-
stituents: complaints about employment discrimination,
denials of government benefits, and grant support let-
ters. This leaves comments on existing laws, pending reg-
ulations, or “other” requests that often take the form of
general requests for action or for transparency about gov-
ernment programs. By limiting the sample to these more
general requests, we have excluded most cases driven by
direct contact from constituents. If the previous results
were entirely a function of variation in constituent will-
ingness to contact their legislators, we would not expect
substantivelymeaningful differences across legislators for
this alternative dependent variable.
We report the results in Tables B4, B7, and B10 of the
SI (A4–A8). Importantly, our results do not differ sub-
stantively after excluding those cases.Members withmili-
tary service backgrounds, femalemembers, andmembers
of racial/ethnic minority heritage are still distinguishable
from their colleagues in the likelihood they intervene on
behalf of the groups with whom they share identities.
We cannot guarantee that interventions with more gen-
eral policy-related aims do not have some unobserved
constituent contact motivating them. But after excluding
cases in which suchmotivations are obvious, our data still
show meaningful differences across legislators. This sug-
gests that our results are not driven solely by the willing-
ness of constituents to bring their concerns to legislators.
Discussion
Does descriptive representation improve advocacy for
protected communities in policy implementation? We
find that legislators are active advocates on behalf of pro-
tected classes with whom they have shared backgrounds.
These results are consistent across women, racial and eth-
nic minorities, and military veterans in Congress. These
findings offer several contributions.
First, they establish the importanceofdescriptive rep-
resentation for interbranch representation of protected
groups using a novel and important legislative behav-
ior. Representation is difficult to evaluate by focusing
on voting, bill sponsorship, committee participation, and
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pork—which are shaped by a range of constraints includ-
ing leadership agenda setting, logrolling, and partisan
pressures. In short, our results provide a cleaner test of
the implications of descriptive representation.
Second, the inclusion of veterans in a study of de-
scriptive representation provides theoretical leverage on
why legislators represent those with whom they share
identity characteristics. Military service is a unique com-
parison case that highlights the importance of shared ex-
perience. Previous studies often argue thatminorities and
women are more active advocates on behalf of their com-
munities, but this is not conventional wisdom about the
shared experience of military service. Unlike race and
gender, veteran status is not a physical feature. Yet, we
find this shared experience is important. Moreover, the
nuance within our findings offers insight into the theo-
retical underpinnings of how descriptive representation
in Congress reflects onto patterns of interbranch interac-
tions. For instance, military service alone does not inspire
legislators to be active advocates for veterans. The differ-
ences in veteran advocacy are driven by legislators with
active- duty service, whereas reserve and national guard
service does not offer meaningful differences. This re-
sult suggests that shared experience improves legislators’
representation through interbranch interactions.
Third, our results—which are consistent across
women, racial/ethnic minorities, and veterans—suggest
that political conflict may not be necessary for the re-
lationship between descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation in Congress to hold. Scholars generally think
of Congress and the public—regardless of party, ide-
ology, or background—as supportive of veterans. This
runs counter to previous arguments that political con-
flict provides the context for patterns of descriptive
representation.
Finally, our findings provide important context for
experimental research by using observational data to
examine representation within the context of the U.S.
Congress and by considering the quality of legislators’
advocacy onbehalf of citizens. Shared identity not only af-
fects legislators’ correspondence-based responses to mail
from citizens of protected groups, but also reflects their
interbranch advocacy as well. This distinction is impor-
tant because legislators’ informal interventions can affect
outcomes for constituents (Ritchie andYou, 2019). This is
the first study to analyze informal legislator interventions
on behalf of protected classes.
Of course, this study has limitations. For example,
the underrepresentation of women, minorities, and vet-
erans in Congress poses a challenge for reliable statistical
inference. In an effort to assess this limitation, we have
conducted a power analysis included in Appendix C of
the SI (A9). Additionally, it is important to reiterate our
analysis is descriptive. Our research design is unable to
adjudicate between causal mechanisms and should be
considered in the broader context of recent experimental
work on legislative representation.
These limitations notwithstanding, our findings of-
fer several potential implications for representation in
Congress. Distinguishing between these competing ex-
planations is important for understanding the impact
of descriptive representation as the number of women,
minorities, and veterans in Congress changes. Our results
offer a somewhat optimistic outlook for the represen-
tation of women, minorities, and veterans as Congress
becomes more diverse. If, as some argue, the substan-
tive outcomes of descriptive representation are electorally
motivated or particular to the electoral context of a single
group, it suggests that the substantiveoutcomes attributed
to descriptive representatives may not remain constant
over time. However, if, as we argue, the shared experience
of these legislators allows them to more adequately assist
constituents with the least understood venue of represen-
tation, it suggests that the connection between descriptive
and substantive representation is likely more stable.
More broadly, our study suggests that underrepresen-
tation inCongressmay also haveundesirable implications
for policy implementation. Since public policy is largely
made through agency decisions rather than statutory en-
actment, it is important for subsequent studies assessing
the quality of representation of protected communities
to examine the backchannels of bureaucratic governance.
Most administrative decisions and interactions with citi-
zens occur outside of the public view, and the incentives
of legislators may not offer citizens equal representation
in this arena.
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